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Introduction
The term “information” has been used to de-
scribe a variety of organizational forms from genetic 
structure to culture. Attempts to include informa-
tion in ecological models have, however, mostly 
relied on vague or enigmatic notions of feedback. 
In cognitive models, information is considered to 
be all raw data available for processing. But it is 
unclear how information is screened or organized. 
This paper addresses the need for revision of cur-
rent notions of information within ecology and 
the cognitive sciences. It is particularly important 
to bridge the gaps that exist between the scales of 
intrapersonal communication, interpersonal com-
munication, and cultural consensus.
Current notions of information, and in par-
ticular attempts to quantify information, can be 
traced to the work of Claude Shannon (Mingers 
1997). In this paper, I will focus on the work of 
Klir and Folger (1988), which represents the most 
rigorous and recent attempt to model information 
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for semantics and pragmatics; and 4) can not account for shared and externalized cognition. A different model 
of information is presented here, which treats information as a process of state change (i.e., the term is used 
as a verb), rather than as a variable. The potential for information is defined to include not only stimuli, 
but the context of the informational moment; and is distinguished from realized information, which is the 
result of a state change. The proposed model also distinguishes epistemological levels of abstraction at which 
information takes place. Abstraction, fuzzy logic, and consensus supersede the reduction of uncertainty, and 
pragmatic contextual marking of information at different epistemological levels provides a basis for explaining 
shared and externalized cognition. 
mathematically, and because it illustrates the preva-
lence of Shannon’s original core concepts (Shannon 
and Weaver 1949). 
My goal is to build upon Klir and Folger’s 
theoretical background by first elucidating its 
limits, and then incorporating ideas from the disci-
plines of cognitive studies, linguistics, information 
philosophy, and information ecology to develop a 
new model of information. I present the case that 
current theory is inadequate because it: 1) only 
accounts for information gain that results from 
reducing uncertainty; 2) assumes binary logic; 3) 
fails to model semantics and pragmatics; and 4) 
has not modeled shared and externalized cogni-
tion. I present a new model, which is based upon 
an interdisciplinary synthesis, and forms the basis 
for formal development. Such a model is necessary 
for understanding human interaction on an inter-
personal and organizational level as well as human 
relationships with non-human components of the 
environment. As such, it is intended to provide a 
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basis for clarifying existing conceptual relationships 
between cognitive theory and behavioral ecology.
Problem 1. Reduction of Uncertainty as the 
Sole Metric of Information
The prevailing notion of information, formal-
ized by Shannon, is the view of information as 
neg-entropy, or the reduction of uncertainty. As 
expressed by Weaver:
That information be measured by entropy is, after 
all, natural when we remember that information, 
in communication theory, is associated with 
the amount of freedom of choice we have in 
constructing messages. Thus for a communication 
source one can say, just as he would also say it 
of a thermodynamic ensemble, ‘This situation 
is highly organized, it is not characterized by a 
large degree of randomness or of choice—that is 
to say, the information (or the entropy) is low.’ 
(Shannon and Weaver 1949:13)
A highly probable event allows no freedom 
of choice and therefore carries little information. 
An example would be the last few letters of the 
word “sentence” in this sentence. The “ence” in 
“sentence” belongs to a class that Weaver calls re-
dundant; “that is to say, this fraction of the message 
is unnecessary (and hence repetitive or redundant) 
in the sense that if it were missing the message 
would still be essentially complete, or at least could 
be completed” (Shannon and Weaver 1949:13). 
This forms the basis of Klir and Folger’s more 
recent approach (Klir and Folger 1988), in which 
they propose that the reduction of uncertainty 
by a measurable amount indicates the gain of an 
equal amount of information. I shall refer to such 
changes as ‘state changes’. The amount of informa-
tion obtained by an act (or state change) may be 
measured by the difference in uncertainty before 
and after the act, and encounters with improbable 
entities are considered to have higher information 
content (Klir and Folger 1988:189).
But this unidirectional approach (Figure 1) 
is inadequate for human communication because 
it does not account for the information content 
of a message which greatly increases uncertainty 
(i.e., accelerates entropy; Brainerd and Reyna 
1990). While it is true that we strive for certainty 
in communication, the structure of our mental 
state – our understanding of syntax, meaning and 
pragmatics – can also be significantly altered by 
an experience that reduces certainty. This derives 
largely from the fact that human information is 
not an objective measurable entity that operates 
merely on a probability matrix, as described by Klir 
Figure 1: the relAtioNships BetweeN eNtropy, iNFormAtioN, ANd proBABility As proposed By 
shANNoN ANd weAver (1949) As A theory oF commuNicAtioN.
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and Folger. Rather, information represents a state 
change (∆) that can include greater uncertainty; 
or in the case of organizational communication, 
greater consensus regardless of uncertainty.
The unidirectional approach becomes even 
more problematic when describing the process 
of abstraction. Following the logic of Klir and 
Folger, in order for ∆ to have a positive value as 
a result of abstraction, the said abstraction must 
increase predictability, or be perceived as such. But 
the resulting abstraction may or may not increase 
certainty. An example is the creation of gist, which 
is a mechanism for dealing with inundations of 
complex environmental stimuli (Brainerd and 
Reyna 1990). Certain attributes of the informa-
tion set are selected in order to essentialize the 
message, but there is no guarantee that the selected 
attributes are appropriate for understanding what 
the sender of the message intends. In such a case, 
abstraction, or gist formation, would not increase 
certainty, although ∆ will have occurred. The need 
to form abstractions can be considered a necessary 
process that increases entropy. That is, cognition 
can produce “information states whose structures 
are impoverished” (Brainerd and Reyna 1990:19). 
Thus, a definition of information limited to 
increased certainty is inadequate for describing 
the short-term, near-instantaneous processes of 
human thought. And, as I will discuss below, such 
a definition also constrains attempts to describe 
processes of externalized cognition and interper-
sonal communication. 
Problem 2. Limits of Binary Logic
Binary logic is another core concept from 
Shannon and Weaver’s conceptualization of com-
munication (1949) carried over into recent theory:
Transformation of information into meaning 
involves a digitalization of the analogue. . . The 
importance of this for information and meaning is 
the argument that our perception and experiences 
are analogue while cognition and meaning are 
progressive digitalizations of this experience. 
. . Meaning, or the semantic content of an 
information source is that information and only 
that information, which is held in digital form. 
(Mingers 1997:81; emphasis in original)
Shannon and Weaver consider choices to be 
binary (either/or), and hence, information could 
be measured by the logarithm to the base 2 (p. 9). 
Binary logic is also basic to Klir and Folger’s more 
recent theoretical revision (1988). They state that 
the truth value of a single proposition (i.e., that an 
element x belongs to a probability set) is denoted by 
the values 1 and 0, and the unit that characterizes 
full uncertainty is a bit (p. 145).
This binary approach has proven to be effec-
tive for mathematical formulations and computer 
science. Such an approach is not, however, always 
applicable to humans. We don’t treat propositions 
as either/or decisions; instead we tend to “hedge” 
and introduce other variables into the decision 
matrix. Analyses of set inclusion indicate that we 
often use more than two dimensions simultane-
ously (D’Andrade 1995:139).
Problem 3. Failure to Model Semantics and 
Pragmatics
Information in human communication is 
commonly divided into three classes: syntactic 
(the relationship among signs employed in com-
munication), semantic (the relationship between 
the signs and meaning), and pragmatic (the relation 
between entities and their utilities)(Klir and Folger 
1988:188; Mingers 1997).
Schwarz’ (1996) analysis of several experi-
ments led him to conclude that pragmatics is the 
most important aspect of human communication. 
There is a “common misperception that language 
use has primarily to do with words and what they 
mean. It doesn’t. It has primarily to do with people 
and what they mean. It is essentially about speak-
ers’ intentions;” that is, the conversational context 
(Schwarz 1996:7, quoting Clark and Schober 
1992). In short, listeners rely more on pragmatic, 
rather than semantic (or syntactic), information. 
Contemporary models based on Shannon’s 
approach are, however, incapable of addressing 
information other than syntactic (Mingers 1997). 
Klir and Folger’s (1988) scheme, building upon 
Shannon’s, applies easily to syntactic information, 
and has been successfully applied to computer sci-
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol3/iss1/1 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.3.1.1
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ence. But, as Klir and Folger point out, semantic 
and pragmatic information are also required for 
human communication:
A measure of uncertainty, when adopted as a 
measure of information, does not include semantic 
and pragmatic aspects of information. As such, 
it is not adequate for dealing with information 
in human communication. (1988:140; emphasis 
in original)
 Such an approach does not say anything 
about how or why particular interpretations are 
generated or selected, and “information” remains 
simply a metric (Mingers 1997). Reduction of 
uncertainty in human cognition is accomplished 
only when options are eliminated; this requires 
a pragmatic connection between the prospective 
outcomes of acts and the entities in which they are 
applied (Klir and Folger 1988:188).
Schwarz (1996) provides a pragmatic model 
in which a tacit assumption underlying the conduct 
of conversation is that “communicated information 
comes with a guarantee of relevance” (p. 4). Lis-
teners assume the speaker tries to be informative, 
truthful, relevant, and clear. Listeners assume that 
speakers are to be informative and are to provide 
information that is new to the recipient, rather than 
to reiterate information that the recipient already 
has (p.6). If a speaker violates these assumptions, 
s/he runs the risk of being misunderstood, because 
listeners still make those assumptions. Thus, com-
municated information comes with at least a partial 
guarantee of relevance, and listeners draw on these 
cooperative assumptions in interpreting the speak-
ers contributions. As a result, information that the 
speaker considers irrelevant (because of a focus on 
semantic meaning) may nevertheless be relevant 
for listeners, who focus on pragmatic implications 
(Schwarz 1996:16). This information is marked 
by context. Information can not be redundant per 
Klir and Folger; that is, it can not have zero value, 
because a repetition has meaning, it reiterates or 
reinforces (Bateson 1972:131). Repetition causes 
a state change, because the listener assumes the 
speaker intends relevance in that repetition, and/or 
the listener may analyze the message in terms that 
question the speaker’s communicative abilities and 
social skills, or the listener may choose not to listen.
Problem 4. Limits in Conceptualizing Shared 
and Externalized Cognition
I will use the term “externalized cognition” to 
refer to those thought processes and environmental 
interactions that are distributed among individual 
organisms and their tools. Hutchins (1995) pro-
vides an example in which the cognitive processes 
involved in flying an airplane are distributed among 
the cockpit crew and their instrumentation. No 
single person internalizes all of the necessary flight 
data, no two people interpret data in the same way, 
nor do they attempt to do so simultaneously. 
Klir and Folger’s (1988) theoretical approach, 
as applied to interpersonal communication, is 
based upon an individual’s matrix of a priori 
assumptions about the probability, possibil-
ity, and pragmatics of stimuli (e.g., potential 
acts, questions, etc.)(p. 234). The stimuli can 
be self-induced or of external origin. Events of 
lesser probability represent higher information. For 
example, getting a “no” answer when one expects 
a “yes” leads to an increase in knowledge (i.e., 
a revision of the probability/possibility matrix), 
whereas receiving a “yes” presumably changes little. 
But, as discussed above, events of high probability 
can also represent increased information (through 
redundancy). In Hutchins’ example of the cockpit 
crew, such redundancy is critical for crew members 
to coordinate distributed cognition. Hence, state 
changes can occur irrespective of probability-
possibility matrices. 
Information in such a system of externalized 
cognition must be marked by the attribution of 
mental states. For example, a speaker may know 
that a listener knows something, but has only a par-
tial theory of what the listener knows. The speaker’s 
theory is structured by pragmatic context, and must 
attribute an appropriate mental state to the would 
be listener. Hence, the level of intensionality is 
specified by the pragmatic context. Information 
marking within contexts is fundamental to the 
structure of consensus, because all consensus is 
context-specific. Thus, Klir and Folger’s model can 
be expanded to include changing contexts external 
to individual probability/possibility matrices.
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The Need for a New Approach
Despite the four problems outlined here, Klir 
and Folger (1988) provide a rich basis for develop-
ing a more comprehensive model of information 
in human communication and human-ecological 
processes. Surprisingly, no comprehensive attempt 
to develop such an approach has occurred within 
ecology or the cognitive sciences, in spite of the 
widespread use of Shannon’s index as a metric of 
ecosystemic complexity and diversity (Ludwig and 
Reynolds 1988).
There is little agreement about the nature 
of information, particularly with regard to its 
semantic and pragmatic aspects (Mingers 1997). 
A fundamental problem is that information is 
neither a physical entity, nor is it a quantifiable 
variable. This inevitably leads to the use of the 
word “information” to signify all data available 
to a processing system, and has led Gilligan to 
propose the paradox: “What is information?” 
How are we to say that there is a difference 
between data and information if there is no way 
to perceive that difference in the world? . . .  If 
there is no distinction between the existence 
of information and believing in the existence 
of information, then we cannot talk about 
information at all. (Gilligan 1997:68)
Most attempts to define information have 
been attempts to arrive at some explanation for a 
state change, and it is possible to escape Gilligan’s 
paradox by reverting to the original use of the 
word “information” as a verb:
It will suffice (and therefore it should be the 
requirement) to use the word information in 
its original sense, that is, as a verb. There is no 
information: we are ‘informed’. (Gilligan 1997:68)
Thus, information can be defined as a state 
change (∆); that is, from a state of no difference, 
to a state of difference. By this definition, infor-
mation is neither a constant nor a variable, and 
it is certainly not a physical entity. Potential in-
formation (Ip) represents the potential for a state 
change, not objective physical phenomena, such 
as photons of light or sound waves. And poten-
tial information is not limited to the existence 
of some symbol or sound, but includes also the 
context of the moment. For example, a pedes-
trian deep in thought might not even notice 
cars passing by. The cars alone do not represent 
potential to be informed (Ip). The context in this 
example also includes behavior and awareness 
(cognitive predisposition). In this case we could 
expect ∆ to equal 0; that is, no state change. If, 
however, our day-dreaming pedestrian strays 
off the sidewalk onto the street and someone 
yells “look-out,” this different Ip could yield a 
∆ much greater then zero; that is, a profound 
state change. In this highly simplified example, 
the words “look out” and their meaning can be 
thought of as Ip; the cars can not.
In sum, information can not occur unless 
the organism or consensual group is predisposed, 
by pragmatic context, to a change of state (∆), 
which also requires the assimilation and internal-
ization of data. By this definition, we can dis-
tinguish potential information from all the data 
that constitute objective reality.
Because information represents any conver-
sion from no difference (∆o) to a state of differ-
ence (∆I), it can be entropic or neg-entropic; 
towards certainty or uncertainty. Our pedestrian 
would be plunged into the realm of uncertainty 
upon hearing the words “look out.” Realized 
information (Ir) can be considered a measure of 
the difference between the original state and the 
subsequent state—the original context and the 
resultant context (i.e., a measure of ∆I). 
Other examples of Ir include abstractions 
and gists (Brainerd and Reyna 1990), which result 
from the need to reduce complexity and coordinate 
distributed cognition. Information is realized (i.e., 
a change of state) by screening data, and becomes 
marked potential information when externalized by 
individuals for the benefit of others within prag-
matic context. The externalization of data, with the 
intention of creating the potential for information 
and/or inducing a state change can be defined as 
‘exformation.’
The information process can be formalized 
by the equation:
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol3/iss1/1 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.3.1.1
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Ip —> Ir = ∆I                      (eq. 1)
By this definition, knowledge is not synony-
mous with information. Information is the change, 
whereas knowledge is one result of the change (Ir). 
Knowledge can be a state of abstraction that is 
achieved as the result of having reduced uncertainty 
through information (∆I). But note that knowledge 
(Ir) can only be produced if there exists the potential 
for information to occur (Ip). 
Also, information here does not represent 
genetic or ecosystemic organization. The latter is 
biological structure, and is the result of informa-
tion (∆I).
A Model of Information
The information process can be represented 
diagrammatically (Figure 2). The concept of epis-
temological levels utilized here (L0 through L5) de-
rives from Klir and Folger (1988: 194) and includes 
a synthesis of concepts from different disciplines 
(Table 1). At lower epistemological levels we deal 
only with raw data. At higher levels we increase 
the level of analysis of relations among data; sets 
become fuzzier and thinking is increasingly more 
abstract. 
Realized information at any epistemological 
level (Ir(Li)) is a function of state changes at lower 
levels, and is potential information at higher levels 
(Ip(Li+1)) if, and only if, there is a state change ∆I 
(Li-1) at the next lower level, that is greater than 0. 
Stated formally:
 Ir(Li)  =  ∆I (L0. . . i)                             (eq. 2)
and
Ir(Li) =  Ip(Li+1) if and only if  ∆(Li) > 0  (eq. 3)
Informational upgrading occurs when Ip that 
results from a state change at one level results in a 
state change at a higher level (Figure 2). The po-
tential for this to occur depends on both a sender’s 
and receiver’s understanding of how a pattern is 
marked. Informational downgrading occurs when a 
state change at a higher level feeds back and causes 
tABle 1: relAtioNs BetweeN discipliNAry views oF epistemologicAl levels.
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Figure 2: pArtiAl model oF iNFormAtioN process ANd its distriButioN over epistemologicAl 
levels.
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a state change at a lower level.
The text within each box in Figure 2 includes 
the terminology that I have chosen for describing 
each epistemological level in this synthesis. L0 rep-
resents a screen of variables. That is, data will only 
be accepted for certain variables, such as sounds 
and gestures in conversation. The variable set that 
exists at any given moment depends on context and 
feedback from higher epistemological levels. Thus, 
intentionality can be partly defined as the ability 
to choose variables at any level (Li).  
L1  is a switch (Figure 2) within which data 
(i.e., states of variables or patterns) are evaluated. 
Messages that yield no state change (∆1 ≈ 0) are 
ignored, they represent absolute redundancy. But 
as discussed below, context rarely allows for this 
condition because all messages are marked by 
cognitive predisposition. Messages that produce 
state changes that are small, that is approaching 
zero (∆1 -> 0), can be relegated to long-term 
memory, or the preconscious (Bateson 1972). An 
example is rote repetition of bodily movements, 
such as when playing a musical instrument. Other 
messages, which produce state changes at L1, are 
potential information (Ip) for higher epistemo-
logical levels.
In the earlier example of the daydreaming 
pedestrian, the words “look out” would force a 
downgrading from a higher, more abstract level, to 
a complete revision of the variables being screened 
at Lo. In particular, the pedestrian would begin 
screening for visual and audio variables that might 
indicate danger. A state of a variable in L1 might 
include a car approaching quickly. 
So far, this discussion has focused on the 
intrapersonal relationships of the model in Figure 
2. As for interpersonal communication, we can 
consider the ability to induce a change of state in 
another person or group to result from potential 
exformation (ExIp; i.e., the intentional creation 
of Ip). Because exformation, as a human product, 
represents a potential to induce a state change at a 
specific epistemological level, it can be said to be 
marked (ExIp
i). As noted by Schwarz:
In general, determining the intended meaning 
of an utterance requires extensive inferences 
on the part of listeners. Similarly, designing an 
utterance to be understood by a given listener 
requires extensive inferences on the side of the 
speaker. In making these inferences, speakers and 
listeners rely on a set of tacit assumptions that 
govern the conduct of conversation in everyday 
life. (Schwarz 1996:7) 
Messages can be marked by the context for 
relevance, obscurity, ambiguity, quantity and 
quality (Schwarz 1996:9). Such marking induces 
a revision of  variables at Lo.
The concept of information applies not to the 
individual messages (as the concept of meaning 
would), but rather to the situation as a whole, the 
unit information indicating that in this situation 
one has an amount of freedom of choice, in 
selecting a message, which it is convenient to 
regard as a standard or unit amount. (Shannon 
and Weaver 1949: 9)
To reiterate an earlier theme of this paper, 
language use has primarily to do with people’s 
intentions (Schwarz 1996). It is through such 
pragmatically contextualized intention that mes-
sages are marked. The notion of marked messages 
provides an informational foundation for con-
sensus theory (Romney et al. 1986). As defined 
in this paper, the potential to inform (Ip) can 
include patterns perceivable by the senses, as well 
as neurophysiologically coded patterns that have 
resulted from previous informational events (i.e., 
ontogenic development and experience), or which 
are genetically determined. 
An example of neurophysiologically coded Ip 
is that some plants look more like each other than 
other plants, and people from all cultures tend 
to distinguish the same pattern of groups – what 
western systematists call the genus (Rosch 1978; 
Berlin 1992). Such natural discontinuities in nature 
provide an example of patterns with the potential to 
inform, but only at certain epistemological levels. 
The ability to draw inferences from those patterns 
(induction), or make predictions (deduction), 
depends on the degree to which the patterns are 
marked by experience.
Marking can occur by one person rearranging 
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patterns of meaning (e.g., color and form in the 
case of modern art) so that they are only recogniz-
able at a specific epistemological level. Marking 
also relies on the ability of the receiver to recognize 
meaning in patterns. Greater abstraction, when 
communicated, leads to a greater state change in 
the recipient because state changes are precipitated 
at all lower epistemological levels.
Potential exformation (ExIp), therefore, rep-
resents the potential for a state change of groups 
of individuals to greater consensus. But total con-
sensus is elusive, so we must generalize, essentialize 
or gist in order to enhance predictability about the 
behavior of others (Hallpike 1986). For example, 
writing is essentialization of spoken language, 
whereas money is the essentialization that allows 
for complex trade and exchange. Realized informa-
tion (Ir) could represent the degree to which money 
increases consensus. 
Robb (1997) alludes to the basic psychologi-
cal need for predictability:
The fact that . . .  we continue to employ so-called 
causal, or predictive, models in singular cases 
suggests to me that they satisfy some deep-seated 
psychological needs which are surfaced under the 
stress of decision taking. As individuals we try 
to think that we are doing the ‘right’ thing and 
so we pass some of the responsibility for many 
decisions on to an ‘expert’ or ‘guru’ or to a body 
of accepted specialist professional knowledge. 
How often we must benefit from the ‘placebo 
effect’ of employing argumentum ad verecundiam. 
(Robb 1997:15)
This describes how we substitute predict-
ability of human behavior for unpredictability of 
natural phenomena through consensus. A process 
which can only occur by pragmatically marking in-
formation at the appropriate epistemological levels.
Conclusion
If information is conceptualized as a process 
of changing states (i.e., as a verb, and not a variable) 
we are able to distinguish between the potential to 
be informed, or to inform others, and the ambient 
raw data that consitutes all objective reality. By also 
recognizing that the potential for information to 
occur is marked by pragmatic context, and at vari-
ous levels of abstraction, or epistemological levels, 
we can begin to bridge the current theoretical gap 
between intrapersonal and interpersonal cognition. 
The concept of pragmatic contextual marking al-
lows us to better understand the trade-offs between 
dealing with inundations of stimuli via abstraction 
or gist, the human need to increase predictability, 
and the need to establish group consensus.
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